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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Melvin Winn appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on his guilty
plea to sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. Winn contends the district court
abused its discretion in denying his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and in imposing sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Winn sexually abused his granddaughter, J.H., by having oral-genital and
manual-genital contact with her on several occasions when she was between sixand eight-years old. (PSI, pp.2-4. 1) Winn also showed J.H. pornographic movies
and asked her if "she wanted to try what was being done on the screen." (PSI, p.3.)
J.H. "refused" but Winn proceeded to abuse her anyway. (Id.)
J.H. originally reported the abuse in 2008 after she was discovered "mooning"
her brother, M.H. (PSI, p.115.) When confronted about her behavior, J.H. said she
did it because she wanted her brother to give her something.

(Id.)

J.H. also

disclosed that Winn touched her vagina then took her to McDonald's and the dollar
store where he bought her a "doctor set." (PSI, pp.115-116.) When interviewed by
law enforcement, Winn denied any abuse and only acknowledged that he may have
accidentally touched J.H.'s vagina while playing with her.

(PSI, pp.116-117.)

Although a CARES interview was conducted in which J.H. disclosed the abuse,
Winn was not prosecuted at that time because the state did not feel it had enough to

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "WINN
psi.pdf."
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prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt "in part because of the defendant and his
family." (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-20, p.39, Ls.13-20.)
In 2011, the abuse came to the attention of authorities again when J.H.'s
brother, M.H., reported to a CARES interviewer that he witnessed Winn "molesting"
J.H.

(PSI, p.4.)

J.H. again confirmed the ongoing abuse.

enforcement interviewed Winn a second time.

(PSI, p.4.)

Law

Winn said it was "possible" he

touched J.H. but "claimed he could not remember due to the time and illegal drug
use." (PSI, p.97.)

Winn requested, and was scheduled for, a polygraph.

(PSI,

p.98.) During a pre-test interview by the polygrapher, Winn admitted he sexually
abused J.H. by touching her vagina "on 5 or 6 different occasions" and performing
oral sex on her "on 2 or 3 different occasions." (PSI, p.102.)
A grand jury indicted Winn on one count of lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen with a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction for a
registerable sex offense. (R., pp.6-7, 9-10.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Winn
pied guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen with
"open sentencing."2 (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-24 (terms of plea), pp.8-15 (plea colloquy); see

R., pp.57-58.)
After he pied guilty, but prior to sentencing, Winn filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

(R., p.72.) The court denied the motion. (Tr., p.25, L.19 - p.26,

L.14.) The court subsequently imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 12 years
fixed. (R., pp.77-79.) Winn filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.)

2

The state also agreed to dismiss the enhancement. (Tr., p.7, Ls.22-24.)
2

ISSUES
Winn states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, upon Mr.
Winn following his plea of guilty?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Winn failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his
pre-sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea given Winn's failure to show a
just reason that would entitle him to withdraw his plea?
2.
Has Winn failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified 25-year sentence with 12 years fixed for sexual abuse of a minor
under sixteen given the nature of the offense and Winn's history as a repeated sex
offender?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Concluding
Winn Did Not Provide A Just Reason That Would Entitle Him To Withdraw His Guilty
Plea
A.

Introduction
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his pre-

sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing "there was newly discovered
evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in his position not
to plead guilty."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

Winn further asserts the state "did not

demonstrate that prejudice would result from withdrawal of the plea." (Appellant's
Brief, p.5.)

The record, however, supports the district court's determination that

Winn failed to demonstrate a just reason entitling him to withdraw his guilty plea.
Winn has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330,
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings
if they are supported by substantial competent evidence.

State v. Holland, 135

Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571
(Ct. App. 1994).
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C.

Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which

provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right.

Hanslovan, 147

Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. See also State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787
P.2d 281, 284 (1990).

Rather, "the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just

reason' exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780
(citations omitted). Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even
absent prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal. State v.
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith,
credibility, and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to
withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at
537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted).
"The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made."

Hanslovan,

147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959,
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). "If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court

5

must then determine whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the
plea."

!sL
On appeal, Winn "asserts he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty

plea," claiming "there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have
motivated a reasonable person in his position not to plead guilty." (Appellant's Brief,
p.6.) Winn "recommends that this Court hold that newly discovered evidence, that
could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in the defendant's position not
to plead guilty, is a just reason to permit the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) It is unclear from this argument whether Winn is claiming
that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary at the time it was made or
whether his claim is that a plea that was valid at the time it was entered may
nevertheless be withdrawn under the "just reason" standard where there is "newly
discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person not to
plead guilty." To the extent Winn contends his plea was not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made, the record shows otherwise.
Before Winn entered his guilty plea, the court explained, and Winn said he
understood, the nature of the charge to which Winn was pleading and the elements
the state would have to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of that charge. (Tr.,
p.9, L.8 - p.10, L.8.) After the state provided a factual basis for the charge, Winn
indicated that although he had a "fuzzy memory" of committing the offense due to his
methamphetamine use, he believed he committed the crime. (Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14,
L.6.) Winn also completed a guilty plea questionnaire in which he acknowledged the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and agreed that his plea was free and
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voluntary and that he was guilty of "the acts alleged in the information or indictment."
(R., pp.60-66.) Winn also answered "no" to the question, "Are there any witnesses
whose testimony would show that you are innocent?" (R., p.64.) In light of Winn's
representations, the court found Winn understood "the nature of the offense and the
consequences of his plea of guilty," that there was a "factual basis for the guilty
plea," and "that the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made." (Tr., p.14, Ls.20_.
25.) The record supports the district court's findings in this regard.
When Winn sought to withdraw his guilty plea, the basis for his motion was
that "he received some additional information from family members that he was not
privy to prior that he thinks would affect the state's case."

(Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.)

Because Winn did not identify what the "additional information" was, the prosecutor
speculated:
I don't know what the supposed new evidence is other than we did
learn and I think we had disclosed that life for [J.H.] hasn't gotten much
easier.
There is a report that her brother, who was a witness to some of
this abuse, who lives in a different home, has since perpetrated on her,
and that was new information that came out. And I think the defendant
is thinking that that's something that he can use. It's the only thing I
can guess, because other than that, there's no other new information
that has come about.

And even as we stand here today, you have been given no
reason, just that he has received some information from family that he
didn't know of before. There's no information that takes away from the
nature of this crime. There's nothing about the information that the
state has received or turned over to the defense that negates what
happened in 2008.
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And so really you're just left here to guess, and I'm guessing
with you, based on what I know has developed in the case, but you
haven't been provided a reason.
(Tr., p.23, L.5 - p.24, L.15.)
Winn responded by reminding the court that he pied guilty pursuant to Alford
because he had no "independent memory of this happening" (Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.25,
L. 1), and arguing:
I don't see any prejudice to the state in having the plea
withdrawn. They did disclose additional information about [M.H.]
abusing the same victim, and that was prior to his plea. But in
conversations he has had with family members, his understanding is
that these allegations basically started in 2006.
And so he believes, again, that that information changes the
state's case in some regard, and he maintains his innocence and
therefore he would like to proceed to trial.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.8-18).
The court denied the motion, concluding:
At the time [Winn pied guilty,] he knew of the allegations of molestation
committed upon the victim by a different family member. And so I don't
see that really as providing sufficient cause that convinces me that
there's just cause to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.

It seems more likely to me that his -- that he is having some
second thoughts, but that there's not information that it would be able
to be unjust to disallow him to withdraw his plea.
(Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.11.)
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion, arguing "there was
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motived a reasonable person in
[his] position not to plead guilty" and the state failed to "demonstrate that prejudice
would result from the withdrawal of the plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The Court
8

need not reach the question of prejudice because Winn has failed to meet his
burden of showing any "newly discovered evidence" that would support a "just
reason" for withdrawing his plea.
Winn did not actually present any newly discovered evidence in support of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Instead, he made vague claims that some

unidentified "family members" said there were allegations about M.H. abusing J.H.
starting in 2006. Although not relied on by Winn, presumably the family member to
which he refers is his daughter, Tina, J.H. and M.H.'s aunt, who accuses J.H. and
M.H. of making "several allegations about other adults over many years, none which
[sic] have ever been true" and claims "[b]oth children are currently being investigated
for participating in sexual acts which one of them has admitted they have been doing
for several years." (PSI, p.125.) Tina also claims M.H. wrote an apology letter
because "he had been caught lying about things he said happened." (PSI, p.125.)
Winn also mentioned this letter to the presentence investigator, but the letter has
never been produced. (PSI, p.5.)
Winn claims "the allegations about M.H. abusing J.H started in 2006 raises
new questions about [his] involvement in the abuse" and "suggests that there could
have been an alternate perpetrator."

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

As noted, Winn

presented no actual evidence that M.H. started abusing J.H. in 2006.

Not even

Tina's letter supports this assertion. Nor is there any evidence that J.H. has made
such a claim.

To the contrary, the record indicates that J.H. told the CARES

interviewer in 2011 that "her older brother 'now did the same things to [her that
Winn] did."' (PSI, p.4 (emphasis added).)
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Even assuming M.H. began modeling Winn's behaviors in 2008, or before,
this does not make M.H. an "alternate perpetrator," it only makes J.H. a victim of two
offenders rather than one as J.H. has been quite clear about the sexual abuse
perpetrated on her by Winn. More importantly, J.H.'s disclosures about M.H. doing
the "same things to [her]" was made to a CARES interviewer and was information
that was undoubtedly available to Winn before he entered his guilty plea. As such, it
is not "newly discovered." State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 765 P.2d 162 (Ct. App.
1988), is instructive.
In Hocker, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea to delivery of a
controlled substance. 115 Idaho 137, 765 P.2d 162. The basis for Hocker's motion
was his "desire to confront an informant who had told law enforcement officers about
his drug activities" and the fact that "he had not admitted his guilt unconditionally."

kl at

138, 765 P.2d at 163. The Court concluded Hocker "failed to establish a just

reason for plea withdrawal which would entitle him to relief under even the most
lenient standard."

kl at 139, 765 P.2d at 164.

The Court reasoned:

Hocker has not identified any questions he might have asked, or any
other benefit his defense might have gained, if the informant had
testified at trial. Indeed, Hocker voluntarily waived the right to confront
the informant, or any other potential witness, when he entered his plea.
Thus, Hocker's argument boils down to his bare desire to exercise a
voluntarily waived right. We hold that, without more, this does not
constitute a just reason to withdraw a valid, carefully entered plea.
Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139, 765 P.2d at 164.
In a footnote, the Court also noted:
In presenting Hocker's motion to withdraw the plea, defense counsel
made a vague allusion to "newly discovered evidence" of possible
criminal activity by the informant. However, this evidence was never
described. We think the attorney's passing comment was insufficient
10

to demonstrate a just reason for withdrawing Hocker's plea. Of course,
we do not suggest that newly discovered evidence never can be an
adequate ground to withdraw a plea. We simply hold that the nature of
the evidence, and its potential relevance to this case, were not
sufficiently established on the record.
Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139 n.2, 765 P.2d at 164 n.2.
As for Hocker's claim that he should have been entitled to withdraw his plea
given his conditional admission of guilt, the Court noted Hocker "freely admitted his
guilt on each element of the crime" and that, "when asked whether he believed he
was innocent, he stated that he was guilty." Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139, 765 P.2d at
164.
Winn distinguishes his case from Hocker, arguing, "Unlike the 'vague allusion'
to newly discovered evidence" in that case, "the nature of [his] newly discovered
evidence and its potential relevance were sufficiently established in this case."
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) To the contrary, as explained, Winn's allegations were not
only vague, the evidence was not "newly discovered." In addition, although Winn
pied guilty pursuant to Alford 3 "based upon [his] methamphetamine use at the time
of the offense" (Tr., p.7, Ls.19-21), when asked whether he believed he was guilty,
Winn said, "I think so, sir, yes" (Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.2). Winn also admitted his
guilt, in detail, during a pre-polygraph interview. (PSI, p.102.) Thus, to the extent
Winn claims the "conditional" nature of his guilty plea weighs in favor of withdrawal, it
does not.
Winn also "recommends that this Court adopt [the] reasoning" of United
States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2005).

3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The

defendant in Garcia moved to withdraw his plea based, in part, on newly discovered
evidence, which he proffered in the form of an affidavit from a witness who was
"unknown to the defense at the time of the plea." 401 F.3d at 1010 and n.2. The
affidavit "directly contradict[ed]" the statements of a different witness who implicated
Garcia in manufacturing methamphetamine.

kl at 1009-1010. The Ninth Circuit

concluded the affidavit was "newly discovered evidence" that entitled Garcia to
withdraw his plea because it "raise[d] new questions about Garcia's involvement in
the illegal activity" and because "had Garcia known about th[e] evidence earlier, he
may well have changed his mind about whether to plead guilty."

kl at 1011. The

Ninth Circuit alternatively articulated the standard as whether the newly discovered
evidence "could have at least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in Garcia's
position not to have pied guilty had he known about the evidence prior to pleading."

kl at 1011-1012.
This Court need not address whether to adopt the standard announced by the
Ninth Circuit in Garcia because Winn cannot overcome the initial hurdle of showing
the evidence upon which his motion to withdraw was premised is "newly
discovered." Even if he could, and even if this Court accepts Winn's request to
follow Garcia, a reasonable person in Winn's position would not have been
motivated to change his decision to plead guilty based on a claim that his victim was
also sexually abused by her brother particularly where, as here, the victim has twice
identified Winn as an abuser and has provided pointed details regarding the nature
of the abuse. Winn's claim otherwise is unpersuasive, especially since he admitted
the abuse to the polygrapher.
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Because Winn failed to provide a just reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea,
he has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion.

11.
Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentencing

by allegedly failing to "adequately consider" Winn's "substance abuse problems" and
his "goal of getting treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Winn has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion given the nature of the offense, his character, and
the objectives of sentencing.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion,

Winn must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140
Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99
Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Winn cannot meet his burden in this
case.
13

Winn claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to
"adequately consider" his "substance abuse problems" and "goal of getting
treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Other than his apparent belief that his
sentence should be shorter because of either or both of these circumstances, Winn
has failed to identify anything in the record that would support his assertion that the
court did not "adequately consider" that information. The district court indicated it
"read everything that is included in the presentence report," which contained
information about Winn's substance abuse problem and plan for treatment. (PSI,
p.16.) This was also the centerpiece of Winn's sentencing argument. (Tr., p.40,
L.22 - p.42, L.7.) As such, Winn cannot seriously contend the district court was not
acutely aware of this information. That the district court did not impose a lesser
sentence because of it does not establish an abuse of discretion. Rather, the district
court properly focused on the fact that Winn "presents a substantial risk to reoffend ." (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-4.) This assessment is supported by the record.
Winn has a prior conviction for lewd conduct for molesting a different child
and a subsequent conviction for providing false information on his sex offender
registration.

(PSI, pp.6, 8, 11.)

"Winn was terminated from sexual offender

treatment for non-compliance when it was discovered he was in the process of
grooming two (2) minor females." (PSI, p.14.) The fact that Winn is a repeat sex
offender who cannot comply with registration requirements and who is a pedophile
that is a high-risk to reoffend (PSI, pp.358, 380), reveals that our most vulnerable
population, our children, require protection from him, satisfying the primary objective
of sentencing.

State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359,363,304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)
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("The primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the good order and
protection of society.").
Winn has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Winn's judgment of
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2013.

JESSIC~ . LORELLO
Deputy A orney General
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